The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the principal multilateral organization mandated by the international community to deal with nuclear issues. Established in 1957 and based in Vienna, it is essentially the nucleus around which all other parts of the global nuclear governance system revolve.
Viewed as one of the most effective and efficient organizations in the UN family, the IAEA has, in many respects, evolved deftly — shedding unrealizable visions, seizing new opportunities and handling with aplomb several international crises.
After 55 years, while the IAEA does not need a dramatic overhaul, it could benefit from strengthening and reform.
The Agency’s involvement in the safety of nuclear facilities and materials derives from international treaty obligations, as well as from a gradual accretion of responsibilities and functions.
A large part of the IAEA’s role is establishing and promoting safety standards with respect to nuclear reactors and materials — including nuclear waste and spent fuel. The IAEA also has an impressive array of safety-related programs to help states improve nuclear safety, including:
On the surface, the IAEA’s role has grown and the Agency is increasingly seen as a central actor. Yet, the system is fragmented, with too many plans and programs for even the most attentive of member states to understand or participate in. Some states are skeptical about an intrusive IAEA role in nuclear safety. Such states, along with the nuclear industry, have consistently argued that the only role the international regime should have is in recommending, facilitating and assisting in this critical area.
The nuclear industry is affected by security in a way that other forms of energy generation are not. This is partly a legacy of the highly secretive nuclear weapons programs from which civilian applications emerged and due to the strategic nature of the facilities and materials involved.
While nuclear security has had a higher profile in IAEA activities since 9/11, the Agency still operates with cautiousness due to member state sensitivities and because other international processes are at play, such as the Nuclear Security Summit initiated by the US in 2010. The global governance regime for nuclear security also offers the challenge of being more fragmented than (and not nearly as Agency-oriented as) the well-established regime for nuclear safety.
Still, the IAEA plays a crucial role in helping to implement the existing legal instruments concerning nuclear security.
The IAEA’s nuclear safeguards and verification system, while a constant work in progress, is a major achievement of international governance, imposing a degree of intrusiveness on states that is unknown in almost any other field.
Since the entry into force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1970), the IAEA has continued to strengthen its safeguards system. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors agreed on the Model Additional Protocol (AP), which expanded the verification responsibilities of both the Agency and each state party.
Despite the highly political atmosphere in which it often operates, the IAEA Secretariat has largely retained its reputation as an objective, impartial and professional body that is well managed and administered, especially compared to the UN norm. Nonetheless, there are accusations from certain member states that it is: not cost-effective enough; insufficiently transparent; not driven by results-based management; lacking in metrics of success; and inadequate in its planning and financial processes.
Organizationally and managerially, the IAEA is hobbled by long-standing constraints. Structural divides and concentrated authority have led to unhealthy competition between departments and a divergence from the “one house” ideal.
The Agency also lacks a proper strategic plan, using instead the Medium-Term Strategy, the latest of which covers the years 2012–2017 and is essentially a list of all the activities that the Agency currently carries out, without prioritization.
The IAEA also suffers from generational change with 22% of its inspectors due to retire and the Secretariat, as a whole, is facing bloc retirements. Further, ongoing competition from industry and national regulatory bodies — combined with the lack of an agile staff recruitment and retention policy — make it difficult for the Agency to offer salaries and benefits that can attract top talent.
The role the IAEA plays in international peace and security, considering its capabilities, size and budget, makes it an indisputable bargain. However, the Agency must prepare for potential future challenges:
As an impartial facilitator and, in some cases, active driver of treaty implementation, the Agency plays a part that even the most powerful of states could not manage alone.
1953
Seeking a way out of the growing nuclear arms race, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed an “International Atomic Energy Agency” to the UN General Assembly that would facilitate the spread of peaceful nuclear technology.
Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech in December 1953 was widely perceived as a master stroke of US diplomacy.
1957
The first IAEA General Conference approved Vienna as the seat of the organization, recommended that priority be given to nuclear activities of benefit to developing countries, and approved the appointment of an American, Sterling Cole, as the first Director General.
The founding years saw peaceful uses of nuclear energy heavily promoted while the Agency also began providing technical assistance in such areas as agriculture and medicine.
At the same time, the IAEA struggled to make its mark, as some of its anticipated functions either disappeared or were purloined by others. For example, the envisaged IAEA stockpile of nuclear material never materialized.
The arrival of the NPT gave the IAEA the task of verifying compliance by the non- nuclear weapon states (NNWS) with their non-proliferation obligations, but it also introduced enduring structural complications for the agency.
The treaty affirmed that in return for assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology the NNWS would not seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Existing nuclear weapon states were also prohibited from assisting any NNWS to acquire nuclear weapons.
Most critically of all, it called for “negotiations in good faith” by all NPT parties to achieve nuclear disarmament.
Today the NPT is almost universal, with one withdrawal (North Korea) and three significant remaining “holdouts”: India, Israel and Pakistan.
(Smiling Buddha/Pokhran-I)
1974
The detonation of a nuclear device in May 1974 by India, a non-party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was an unexpected shock.
Although India had only violated a “gentleman’s agreement with Canada and the United States,” the test spotlighted the “peaceful nuclear explosion” loophole in early safeguards.
The Indian explosion also led to the establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group that seeks to agree to guidelines that restrict the export of certain nuclear and dual-use materials, equipment and technologies.
In 1979, the IAEA Board of Governors approved a revised version of the Guiding Principles and General Operating Rules for the provision of Technical Cooperation, which sought to avoid the misuse of Technical Cooperation for so-called peaceful nuclear explosions.
1986
The 1986 Chernobyl disaster was a wake-up call to the nuclear industry, national governments and the international community: global nuclear safety requires a global approach.
The disaster paradoxically revived the IAEA’s fortunes in the area of nuclear safety, spawning the 1986 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the 1986 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.
After Chernobyl, numerous other initiatives were taken to strengthen the global governance of nuclear safety.
1991-2003
The general complacency over safeguards was shattered with the revelation after the 1990 Gulf War that Iraq had been clandestinely mounting a nuclear weapons program in parallel with its IAEA-inspected peaceful program.
The IAEA’s failure to detect Iraqi activities, located in some cases “just over the berm” from where inspectors regularly visited, brought ridicule from those who misunderstood the limitations of the Agency’s mandate and despair on the part of safeguards experts who had for years feared this outcome.
After the discovery that Iraq had come close to nuclear weapons capability, the IAEA strengthened its verification system, not least through adoption of the Model Additional Protocol.
In 2003, the IAEA and its Director General found themselves at the heart of an international crisis as the UN Security Council considered whether to authorize a military operation against Iraq on the grounds that it had not removed its so-called weapons of mass destruction capabilities.
1992 - present
In 1992, North Korea was found in non-compliance of its safeguard agreements, and left the NPT and the IAEA in 1994. The Six-Party Talks were designed to bring North Korea back into compliance but they floundered when it was revealed that North Korea had a uranium enrichment program in addition to its previously discovered plutonium program.
The so-called Leap Day Deal between North Korea and the United States in 2012 was the first hopeful sign in years that IAEA inspectors may be invited back, this time to verify a halt to uranium enrichment. Since then, prospects have dimmed after another missile test by North Korea which was in violation of UN Security Council resolutions — North Korea had previously detonated two nuclear devices, one in 2006 and one in 2009.
If and when the Agency re-engages with North Korea, it will need to develop credible and sustainable means of verifying a uranium enrichment freeze, in addition to re-instituting its past activities with respect to plutonium production and, ultimately, de-weaponization.
1993
The IAEA began probing illicit nuclear smuggling activities through the discovery of network operated by Pakistani nuclear program director Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan.
Through his training at the URENCO enrichment plant in the Netherlands and with stolen blueprints, Khan spearheaded an enrichment program in Pakistan, which led to the country’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Khan subsequently set up an international smuggling network to provide Iran, Libya and North Korea with various degrees of illicit nuclear assistance, including blueprints for Iran’s enrichment program.
The IAEA’s activities in countering nuclear smuggling are intended to further both nuclear security and non-proliferation objectives. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the IAEA also plays a role in preventing nuclear terrorism.
1994
The Chernobyl nuclear accident (1986) provided the impetus for the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS)—the first legally binding multilateral nuclear safety treaty—and the 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
Applying to land-based civilian nuclear power reactors and their radioactive wastes and spend fuels, the CNS requires its contracting parties to submit detailed, periodic national reports for peer review.
While the IAEA’s formal duties in implementing the CNS are restricted, in practice the Agency has a significant degree of influence on the treaty’s operation: organizing the peer review system, promoting nuclear safety, assisting states in achieving it and promulgating influential standards and guides.
2003-present
Since 2003, the IAEA has been embroiled in a continuing struggle with Iran in order to determine the precise details of the country’s non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.
Although taxing on the IAEA Secretariat, the Iran case has enabled the Agency to demonstrate the power of strengthened safeguards, notably those that do not require Iran to adopt an Additional Protocol.
Ultimately, the standoff with Iran is a failure of the mechanisms meant for dealing with non-compliance and the case has soured the atmosphere in the IAEA Board of Governors, deterring it from taking additional safeguards-strengthening measures.
2007
In September 2007, Israel attacked a facility in Dair Alzour, Syria that was believed to be the site of a nuclear reactor built with North Korean assistance. The IAEA called on Syria to provide further information but Syria offered little cooperation and maintained that the destroyed facility was not nuclear related.
Eventually Syria agreed to an IAEA visit to the location in June 2008 where evidence gathered indicated that the destroyed facility was “very likely” a nuclear reactor.
Other potential nuclear sites have been identified in Syria. No enforcement action has been taken to date by the UN Security Council on this issue.
2011
Following the events at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi reactors on March 11, 2011, the IAEA’s halting response led many observers to question its effectiveness as the global “hub” of nuclear safety.
Several international gatherings thereafter have urged the IAEA to improve its preparedness for nuclear accidents and emergencies.
A Draft Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, agreed to in September 2011 by the general conference and board of governors, contains a long-list of initiatives to be taken by member states, the Secretariat, and other stakeholders, but does not commit anyone to mandatory steps. Notably, the Action Plan does not commit states to mandatory IAEA-led nuclear safety peer reviews.
Trevor Findlay, CIGI Senior Fellow
Download Special Report: Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the principal multilateral organization mandated by the international community to deal with nuclear issues. Established in 1957 and based in Vienna, it is essentially the nucleus around which all other parts of the global nuclear governance system revolve. The report, based on more than two years of research, interviews and consultations, concludes that the IAEA is:
The IAEA has attributes and roles that cannot be matched by other organizations, groups of states or individual states, no matter how powerful or influential:
The organization has in many respects evolved deftly over the past 55 years, shedding unrealizable visions, seizing new opportunities and handling with aplomb several international crises into which it has been drawn. Its Secretariat’s technical competence and professionalism is highly regarded. The IAEA is widely viewed as one of the most effective and efficient in the UN family of organizations. Zero real budgetary growth has forced the Agency to stay relatively compact and to continuously seek efficiencies.
The research for the report confirms that, nonetheless, while the IAEA does not need a dramatic overhaul, it does need strengthening and reform — in particular respects. The Agency has not taken advantage of all the authorities and capacities that it has, and it sometimes has failed to seize opportunities staring it in the face. Like all venerable organizations it also suffers from a number of longstanding “legacy” issues that need fixing.
For the IAEA’s key programs — safeguards, safety, security and promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy — the following conclusions were reached:
Among the Agency’s governance, managerial and administrative challenges are the following:
In addition to meeting current expectations, the Agency also needs to prepare itself for future challenges:
Reform and strengthening is already occurring in a number of areas of the IAEA’s operations. Unless otherwise indicated, the report endorses such efforts and, in many instances, recommends that they be pursued with even greater vigour. The report also identifies a raft of other possibilities, both major and minor, for improving the Agency’s performance in the short to medium term. In most cases, however, change will only be achievable if all the players work in tandem. Several proposals would require amending the Statute or involve decisions by the Board of Governors (BoG) and or the General Conference (GC). There should be no illusions about the difficulty of achieving agreement on these. Although there are some reforms that the Director General (DG) and Secretariat can themselves initiate, in almost every case they will require at least the tacit support of member states. In many instances a balance will need to be struck between cost, feasibility and member states’ sensitivities about intrusiveness, confidentiality and sovereignty. The newly emerging powers, those with greater political and financial clout and growing nuclear energy industries, such as Brazil, China, India and South Korea, should play a greater role in governing, managing, supporting and funding the Agency than they have in the past. A full list of these recommended proposals can be found on page in the full report.
While the report puts no dollar or euro figure on what is required, it is an inescapable conclusion that the Agency is significantly underfunded, considering its responsibilities and the expectations increasingly being placed on it. Fukushima has reinforced this conclusion. In almost all cases, strengthening and reform will require additional resources, especially funding that can usually only be provided by the member states holding the purse strings. Hence, the importance of a grand budgetary bargain along the lines proposed in the report.
One of the Agency’s major challenges is to meet the expectations of its member states and other nuclear stakeholders, which are often unrealistic. By being more transparent, open and honest about the functions it can and cannot fulfill, and being more diligent in providing convincing justification for funding increases in particular programs, the Agency may be able t attenuate this problem. This is especially important at a time of global financial stringencies. The Agency should also beware of raising unrealizable expectations itself: it should not describe itself as the hub, central point or focal point of a particular realm unless it is truly able to fulfill such functions.
Since it is states that established the IAEA, pay for it, provide its personnel and other resources, and grant it the necessary privileges and immunities, it is they that ultimately control its destiny. It is true that, like many organizations, the Agency has assumed an independent identity and presence in international affairs that no one member state can gainsay, and that in some circumstances it has some room for independent manoeuvre, especially by balancing the interests of various member states. It can in some respects strengthen and reform itself. But ultimately, it is constrained by the strong preferences of its membership as a whole or those of key, active member states. It is therefore to the member states that we must look to trigger and sustain lasting strengthening and reform — and thus unleash the nuclear watchdog.
This interactive feature was created to support the June 2012 release of CIGI Senior Fellow, Trevor Findlay’s special report, Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA. Full credits related to the special report are available in the report document.
Steve Cross, Media Designer
Brandon Currie, Project and Publications Editor
Kevin Dias, Communications Specialist
Trevor Findlay, CIGI Senior Fellow
Fred Kuntz, Vice President of Public Affairs
Jennifer Goyder, Publications Editor
Kristine Lougas, Online Editor
Joanne Mirek, Research Support Specialist
Natasha Scott, Web Developer
Som Tsoi, Digital Media Manager
Kristopher Young, Multimedia Editor
Image Credit: Old IAEA Building, Vienna, Austria. (IAEA Photo)
Video Speaker: Trevor Findlay, CIGI Senior Fellow; Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Video Image Credits:
Image Credit: Standard maintenance check of system and components at a nuclear power station. (Arthus-Bertrand)
Video Speaker: Trevor Findlay, CIGI Senior Fellow; Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Video Image Credits:
Image Credit: Nuclear reactor. (IAEA Photo/Dean Calma)
Video Speakers:
Trevor Findlay, CIGI Senior Fellow; Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Video Image Credits:
Image Credit: IAEA safeguard inspector checking fuel assembly in a transport container located in the fresh fuel storage of the Mochovce nuclear power plant. (IAEA Photo/Dean Calma)
Video Speaker: Trevor Findlay, CIGI Senior Fellow; Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Video Image Credits:
Image Credit: IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei confers with Mr. Milenko E. Skoknic, Chairman of the Board of Governors for 2007-2008, before the start of the regular meeting. (IAEA Photo/Dean Calma)
Video Speaker:
Trevor Findlay, CIGI Senior Fellow; Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Video Image Credits:
Image Credit: IAEA Seibersdorf Laboratory, Austria. (IAEA Photo/Dean Calma)
Video Speaker:
Trevor Findlay, CIGI Senior Fellow; Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Video Image Credits:
Image Credit: Seen here as he addressed this morning's plenary meeting of the General Assembly is President Dwight D. Eisenhower, of the United States. 22 September 1960, United Nations, New York. (UN Photo/Yutaka Nagata)
Video Speakers:
Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Video Image Credits:
Image Credit: Overall view of the International Atomic Energy Conference in Vienna's "Konzerthaus" (Concert House) in Austria, October 1, 1957. (AP Photo)
Image Credit: Secretary Dean Rusk prepares to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty as President Lyndon B. Johnson and other officials look on. (LBJ Library Photo/Yoichi Okamoto)
Video Speakers:
Alistair Edgar, Associate Professor of Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University; Director, Academic Council on the United Nations System
David Welch, Professor of Political Science, University of Waterloo; CIGI Chair of Global Security and Director, Balsillie School of International Affairs
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Image Credit: Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, center, examines a piece of rock at the nuclear test site in Pokhran, southeastern India. (AP Photo)
Video Speakers:
David Mutimer, Associate Professor of Political Science; Director, Centre for International and Security Studies, York University
Ashok Kapur, Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Waterloo
Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
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Image Credit: A helicopter moves in to help experts check the damage to the Chernobyl reactor in 1986. (Ukrainian Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries)
Video Speakers:
John Jaworsky, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Waterloo
Alistair Edgar, Associate Professor of Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University; Director, Academic Council on the United Nations System
Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
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Image Credit: UN/IAEA inspectors examine suspect equipment in Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War. (IAEA Action Team Photo)
Video Speakers:
Alistair Edgar, Associate Professor of Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University; Director, Academic Council on the United Nations System
Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
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Image Credit: The cooling tower of the Yongbyon nuclear complex is demolished in Yongbyon, North Korea. (AP Photo/Xinhua, Gao Haorong)
Video Speakers:
David Welch, Professor of Political Science, University of Waterloo; CIGI Chair of Global Security and Director, Balsillie School of International Affairs
Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
James Manicom, Balsillie School of International Affairs
Video Image Credits:
Image Credit: The visitor's book at the Hotel Hendrina Khan in Timbuktu, Mali, shows an entry by owner and Pakistani atomic scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan and supplier Henk Slebos. (AP Photo/Ben Curtis)
Video Speakers:
Ashok Kapur, Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Waterloo
Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Video Image Credits:
Image Credit: General view of the pool storage where spent nuclear fuel tanks are unloaded in baskets under 4 meters of water to decrease temperature as part of the treatment of nuclear waste at the Areva Nuclear Plant of La Hague. (AP Photo/Francois Mori)
Image Credit: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, speaks at a ceremony in Iran's nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz, Iran. (AP Photo/Hasan Sarbakhshian, File)
Speakers:
Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Research Scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University
Thomas R. Pickering, Vice Chair of Hills & Company; Former United States Ambassador, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Video Image Credits:
Image Credit: This Aug. 5, 2007 satellite image shows a suspected nuclear reactor site in Syria. (AP Photo/DigitalGlobe)
Speakers:
Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
David Welch, Professor of Political Science, University of Waterloo; CIGI Chair of Global Security and Director, Balsillie School of International Affairs
David Mutimer, Associate Professor of Political Science; Director, Centre for International and Security Studies, York University
Ashok Kapur, Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Waterloo
Video Image Credits:
Image Credit: IAEA fact-finding team leader Mike Weightman examines Reactor Unit 3 at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant on 27 May 2011. (UN Photo/IAEA/Greg Webb)
Video Speakers:
Trevor Findlay, CIGI Senior Fellow; Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Akira Igata, Doctoral Student in the Graduate School of Law, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan, and Working Group Member, Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident
David Welch, Professor of Political Science, University of Waterloo; CIGI Chair of Global Security and Director, Balsillie School of International Affairs
Video Image Credits: