Increasingly, outer space is being deemed a battleground for nation-states. A cyberattack against Viasat’s communications network marked the “first shot” of Russia’s Ukraine invasion. Some satellites are feared to be weapons in disguise. China’s robotic capabilities in space are raising concerns. And there are fears that Russia might pursue nuclear weapons in orbit.
It's timely, then, that the Canadian Parliament’s Standing Committee on National Defence is studying “space defence.” Urgent questions confront us. Chief among them is how Canada will pursue defence in space. When the question of the deployment of armed satellites is inevitably raised, the answer should be an unequivocal “no.”
The scope of risk in this domain is large and growing. There are roughly 10,000 operational satellites in orbit that contribute to essential infrastructure and services all around the world, aiding both civilian and military users. Protecting them from harm is not easy: satellites generally travel in predictable orbits, are exposed to the surrounding environment and have numerous digital vulnerabilities. A shift in focus from space-for-warfighting to warfighting-in-space is ratcheting up defence concerns.
The United States has said it aims to achieve “combat readiness” in space by 2027. The European Defence Fund is investing in stealth “bodyguard” satellites with laser and robotic capabilities to counter threats. Although Russia and China publicly promote a legal ban on weapons and the use of force in outer space, both are actively pursuing a range of capabilities that could be used for harmful purposes in space. Canada’s military space unit, 3 Canadian Space Division, is tasked with “defending and protecting military space capabilities, including in collaboration with its allies and partners.” It will be tempting, therefore, for this country to develop so-called “active defences,” using robotics, lasers or microwave capabilities to target perceived threats in space. But what is defensive can also be offensive.
Canada should resist this temptation, which will only abet a new arms race in space. Resistance would uphold a long-standing Canadian position on the world stage.
It is possible to assert this position responsibly, without ignoring the need for defence.
For example, Canada’s military space surveillance capabilities already contribute to making orbits more transparent by identifying, tracking and characterizing objects and activities in space. This activity supports national and allied security, including the work of the US Combined Space Operations Center, and aids diplomatic efforts to dissuade harmful actors. Additional investment in this area is warranted. Also needed are enhanced capabilities to communicate concerns with adversaries and allies alike, particularly in a crisis.
Canada can also adopt measures to decrease insecurity in space. Resiliency is key; fears of a “Space Pearl Harbor” date back to 2001. The solution has been to redesign capabilities, focusing on distributed constellations rather than on single satellites. Promoting interoperability among allies’ capabilities and commercial operations provides redundancy. This approach has proven beneficial in Ukraine, where space-based internet access has overcome interference efforts. Canadian investment in communication and remote sensing capabilities, particularly those covering the Arctic, supports such resilience.
Investing in more robust systems that resist interference is essential. It’s not just satellites that matter; secure communication links and ground stations are critical. So too is differentiating the effects of intentional harms from those caused by natural hazards in space.
Further on the constructive side, Canada has not engaged in inflammatory rhetoric about weapons and warfighting in space. Instead, the country contributes to developing multilateral norms of responsible behaviour at the United Nations and other fora. Canada was the first state to join and promote the US moratorium on destructive anti-satellite missile tests and, so far, has not sought to obtain counterspace (weapons) capabilities.
There is much to build on here.
Canada should continue along the path of non-weaponization by creating a national space policy that articulates its core values and commitments. It would not be alone in this. Among the members of the Five Eyes security alliance, New Zealand provides an example of balancing defence concerns with obligations to international peace and security, including non-weaponization.
But a line must be drawn when it comes to arming satellites. Deploying such weapons, even for defensive purposes, will undoubtedly trigger an arms race and risk escalating current orbital tensions into armed conflicts. Such escalation could be catastrophic. The effects of a nuclear blast in orbit are unimaginable. Mass satellite extinction and environmental catastrophe would ensue. Even short of this outcome, the high likelihood of indiscriminate harms from resulting space debris and damage to essential civilian services globally is unacceptable. Space is too important for war. All states must focus on preventing such devastation by resisting the false promises of weapons.
Canada is not alone in considering how to protect its essential space capabilities; North Atlantic Treaty Organization members and Australia and Japan are asking the same questions. The recommendations of the Standing Committee on National Defence will not only shape Canada’s future approach to space but also contribute to the global discussion. That’s why this country needs to stake out a clear position against the arming of satellites, in support of global peace and security — and without delay.
